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Abstract 
The Middle East accounting standards were reformed to improve the quality of accounting information. The 
Middle-East countries, to a large extent, have welcomed the International Accounting Standards. The current 
research addresses the question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is 
associated with a lower level and magnitude of earnings management. This study uses the level of earnings 
management as a proxy for earnings quality, and therefore the quality of financial statements. In this way, 
earnings management has been quantified by discretionary accruals. Francis et al., (2008) model and Modified 
Jones model (1995) have been used to determine the level and magnitude of earnings management in selected 
countries. This research employed two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to investigate 
the effect of accounting standards reform on earnings, different unbalanced panels were used based on a sample 
of non – financial public companies (Iran 1996 to 2010, Bahrain 1998 to 2010, UAE 1998 to 2010 and Saudi 
Arabia 1998 to 2010). 
Keywords: Earnings management, earnings quality; accounting standards. 
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1. Introduction  
Financial reporting plays a significant role in communicating financial information to users in a right time and 
credible conduct [29; 214-219]. There are different user groups of financial statements. These groups are 
lenders, investors, suppliers, customers, government and general public. The users are interested in using the 
accounting information, because this information has fulfilled a decision usefulness information criterion [17: 5-
6]. The users of financial statements make decisions based on information which is obtained from the financial 
statements. In this way, having the amounts of earnings is the easiest criterion for evaluating of companies’ 
economic performance. Thus, the financial reporting effectively has to communicate financial information to 
users in a credible and timely manner. 
Academic research has concluded that managers engage in earnings management to accomplish certain 
objectives such as avoiding loss, meeting market expectations, avoiding debt covenant violations etc. Whatever 
the motivation, it is documented that earnings management harms earnings quality [16: 92-222] and misleads 
financial reporting users. According to author [1:617-652] managers are given opportunities for misleading the 
financial information users. In many cases, managers manipulate earnings amount to meet specific intentions. 
For instance, sometimes the bonus or compensation is related to the result of financial performance; therefore, 
managers have incentives to show desired amount of earnings by doing earnings management. While maybe the 
financial statements are manipulated, it is not easy for the financial statements users to evaluate the operating 
performance and the financial position. Therefore, it can be concluded that cosmetic of financial reports or 
financial statements may mislead the users. There is information asymmetry between external users and 
managers that allow managers to use their discretion in reporting accounting information for their own benefits. 
The issue of the quality of accounting information is very crucial to analysts when they assess the fundamentals 
of a firm. The quality of accounting information comes from the implementation of an accounting information 
system quality [3: 14]. Since the information contained in the financial statements is a result of a particular 
firm's accountant's applications of various accounting procedures, therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
an analyst to arrive at the "true" or the "theoretical" value of the firm by relying solely on the firm's annual 
report. 
Middle East countries implement economic reforms to stimulate private investment, promote economic growth 
and support the transition to market economy. It is difficult to define the direct impact of the accounting system 
reform on economic transformation, as many other conditions have influenced the transition process. In this 
way, Middle East accounting bodies have experienced some major changes during the past several years. Prior 
to 1990, there were no national accounting standards for countries in this region because of the absence of 
accounting organizations. Underdevelopment of accounting and auditing standards is one of the main problems 
for auditors' confirmative job and investors in making investment decisions. For example, this was one of the 
main reasons for Kuwait's stock market crash in 1982 [27]. Therefore, Middle East countries had to use 
accounting standards of other countries to start the process of making reliable financial information. 
Development of accounting during this period was essentially a result of the influence of several economic 
factors such as: entrance of multinational enterprises and international accounting firms, licensing of 
international financial institutions and increasing presence of expatriate accountants and foreign technology 
[30]. 
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Investors’ need for reliable financial information has been the key factor of accounting reform in the Middle 
East. This factor protects domestic and foreign investors from any fraud or misleading financial data [27]. In 
spite of all efforts for developing financial markets, economic and accounting, there is no empirical evidence to 
examine the effect of accounting information on earnings management in this region. Previous studies have 
investigated earnings management practices and examined monitoring mechanisms in different legal 
environments and economies; however, despite this region’s vital role in the global economy as the largest 
exporter of petroleum in the world, the Middle East environment has not yet been the subject of academic 
studies which would inevitably play a significant role in improving internal and external monitoring 
mechanisms. 
By adopting IAS, these countries seek to enter global capital markets and participate in the benefits 
globalization is thought to bring. While the adoption of IAS is relatively simple, its implementation is not, and 
developing countries and emerging economies face particular challenges if they want to make IFRS a reliable, 
regulated reality and not just an image. Furthermore, this research focuses on earnings management in selected 
Middle Eastern countries and the relationship between accounting standards and earnings management in these 
countries. It investigates earnings management and also shows how accounting standards can effect on earnings 
management. Moreover, it argues that high quality accounting standards constrain earnings management, and 
thus provide high quality reported financial information. 
1.1 Literature review 
In recent times, one of the news that is most attractive is a series cases abut financial crisis which is related to 
the public companies. A number of these companies are well-known and also have high stock prices. 
Consequently of the financial crisis, mostly it is too late for many creditors that can to withdraw their loans, and 
also for investors to buy their own stocks. Thus, it hardly damages investors and creditors. We could conclude 
that it is due to creditors and investors do not find through the earnings manipulated by managers absolutely [15: 
365-383]. In addition, the companies that manipulate earnings will have significant stock price decrease when 
the manipulations news will inform in public [9: 51-89].  
In literature, many researches [7], [20] and [21] are about earnings management that only focus on recognizing 
some of factors that are related to earnings management which can affect earnings management significantly. 
Thus, we can only understand the relation between earnings management and these factors, but for predicting of 
earnings management level cannot use these factors directly in advance, such as downward and upward earnings 
management. In order to reduce earnings management risks that are related to the financial crisis and obtaining 
information for the investors to avoid a great loss in the stock market, we need to develop a model that can 
predict the earnings management level [25: 7183-7191]. 
Earnings management does not have a common definition in the literature and authors explain it in a large range 
of terms about the same experience or its different aspects. It can clearly explained as follow: “Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” [15: 365-383]. 
318 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2015) Volume 20, No  2, pp 316-333 
The most important role of financial information is to communicate financial information effectively to 
outsiders in a well-timed and reliable manner. For achieving this purpose, managers have to do judgment in 
financial reporting. Thus, they have opportunities to exercise earnings management. If managers have incentives 
to misinform the users of financial statement by doing discretion via accounting method choices in financial 
reporting, then earnings management may occur [29: 214-219]. 
There are many increasingly cases about financial crisis that are related to the public companies recently, but for 
most of creditors and investors are difficult to predict the financial information crisis, particularly in the cases 
related to earnings management. Earnings management is done by managers by manipulating earnings to meet 
purposes of managers by using certain processes or methods. In literature, most of studies that are related to 
earnings management focus on recognizing some factors which are related to earnings management and also can 
significantly affect it. Hence, we can only describe the relation between earnings management and these factors. 
However, it is impossible to predict the level of earnings management by considering these factors directly in 
advance (such as downward and upward earnings management). In order to decline the earnings management’s 
risks in financial crisis and giving information to the investors for avoiding a great loss in the stock market [25: 
7183-7191]. 
A major part of earnings management literature describes the expression of earnings management. Author [23: 
91-102] conceptually explains a framework to analyze earnings manipulation from an information view. Author 
[8: 3-36] uses the earnings management in some parts in buyout. Author [6: 99-126] deduces that firms‟ 
managers manage earnings to have forecasts of financial analysts. Author [28: 112-134] say that earnings 
management can be described from a point of view by contract (with lenders and/or managers), because it is 
expensive for decision makers to have “see through” the earnings management. Also, it must be highlighted that 
most literature focuses on earnings management in assertion of income smoothing techniques and is as a focus 
on accruals accounts. Author [26: 365-380] suggests earnings management models for analyzing [21]. 
According to author [4], the quality of accounting information reflects the interaction of characteristics of the 
financial system that include accounting standards, their enforcement, interpretation and litigation. In this way, 
the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) has applied an approach for development of different 
standards from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) which can result with different quality in 
accounting information. In particular, the approach of IASB more relies on principles, whereas the approach of 
FASB more relies on rules. Guidelines are specified by reliance on principles, but judgment in application is 
required. Reliance on rules more specifies requirements which less leave room for discretion. Author [11: 1101-
1124] expands a model of rational expectations that shows some accounting standards which limit result of 
opportunistic discretion in earnings of accounting that are more reflective economy of an underlying firm and, 
therefore, has higher quality. The flexibility of IAS principles based standards try to allow firms to manage 
earnings, thus accounting quality decrease. This flexibility feature has long been a focus of regulators of 
securities markets, especially in international area [5]. 
 The work of Author [14] had an important impact on empirical research in cross country differences in 
accounting practices and standards. They showed countries that have English common law in their legal systems 
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are eager to have better development in economy, better accounting standards, stronger capital markets and 
more effective enforcement than countries have code law legal systems. In many of recent studies in accounting, 
distinction between code law and common law countries and differences in economic development and 
enforcement have been considered as country level determinants that used either in the Author [14] data or more 
recent measures like [2: 235-270].  
Author [19: 471-517] investigated that countries under English common law systems have much better quality 
in accounting standards in comparison with countries under German origin legal systems, and in turn these 
countries have significantly better quality in accounting standards in comparison with countries under French 
origin legal systems. About some enforcement mechanisms, Author [19] also showed that civil law countries are 
considerably weaker than countries with English common law.  
By considering cultural dimensions of Hofsted, author [14] expanded the four legal control accounting value 
dimensions versus professional regulation of accounting, sameness of accounting rules versus flexibility, 
conservatism in accounting measurement versus optimism, and transparency in accounting disclosures versus 
secretiveness. The last dimension transparency in accounting disclosures versus secretiveness is relevant here. 
Author [14] Argued: “the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the 
lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity, then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of 
secrecy.” In this way, it is expected firms from such countries to have poorer transparency in financial reporting. 
Put another way, firms from countries that have low uncertainty avoidance, to have higher disclosure levels, 
high individualism, low power distance and/or high masculinity cultural ranks [14: 1-15]. 
Author [24: 155-180], investigates whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management. 
They investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings 
management compared to German companies reporting under domestic GAAP, while controlling for other 
differences in earnings management incentives and enforcement mechanisms. The results of their study suggest 
that without the possibility of using hidden reserves to manage earnings, IFRS-adopters turn more to 
discretionary accruals to manage their earnings. However, when hidden reserves are taken into consideration, 
IFRS adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under 
German GAAP. Author [31] systematically investigates the relation between accounting standards and 
international earnings management. He find that international accounting standards, accrual-based accounting 
standards, accounting standards with increased disclosure requirements, and separating tax and financial 
reporting all constrain earnings management. He concludes that accounting standard policy is an important 
institution in determining the quality of reported financial information. 
2. Data and methodology 
In this study independent variables or specific financial statement variables are: total assets, total liabilities, total 
cash, total debt, total depreciation, total revenue and total property, plant and equipment. Information about 
these variables is collected from annual financial statements in selected countries listed companies.  
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Dependent variable in this study is:  
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for determining earnings management are used.  
Independent variables in this study are:  
Accounting standards reform that is shown by dummy variable Dst. 
Prior researches have indicated that many other factors are being that effect on earnings management. There are 
some controls variables that are considered to more reliable results about impact of accounting standards on 
earnings management. These variables are size, debt, growth, liquidity and loss. In next paragraph all control 
variables are explained. 
This research incorporates two directions of earnings management: it measures the level of earnings 
management by two different methods (Francis et al., and Modified Jones Model) and then investigates the 
effect of accountings standards reform on earnings management. Previous studies in different countries were 
done by discretionary accruals to determine earnings management (e.g., [13]; [21]). 
Hypothesis for this study as follow: 
There is positive impact of accounting standards reforms on earnings management in selected Middle East 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Iran).  
Sub hypotheses:  
1- There is a positive impact of accounting standards reform on earnings management in Iran stock market.  
2- There is a positive impact of accounting standards reform on earnings management in Bahrain stock market.  
3- There is a positive impact of accounting standards reform on earnings management in Saudi Arabia stock 
market.  
4- There is a positive impact of accounting standards reform on earnings management in UAE stock market. 
The statistical population in this research is the companies in four selected Middle Eastern countries (Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Iran). The period of study is between 1996 till 2010. Due to different date of reform 
in selected countries and limitation for data gathering, these periods for these countries are different (Bahrain: 
14 years (1997-2010), 22 companies, Iran: 15 years (1996-2010), 283 companies, Saudi Arabia: 13 years (1998-
2010), 98 companies and UAE: 13 years (1998-2010), 47 companies). A sample of statistical population is 
selected out of the total companies listed in stock market in selected countries (all companies except banks and 
insurance companies). 
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The practice of using discretionary accruals to proxy for EM is consistent with the extant EM literature. In this 
study two methods are used to measure the earnings management, namely the Francis et al., [32] and Modified 
Jones (1995) models. The model of Francis [32] extends the Dechow and Dichev [33] accrual quality model by 
adding two variables, namely the change in revenues (REW), and property, plant and equipment (PPE), both of 
which are scaled by the average total assets.  
Step 1: Determining total Accruals by equation (1) for each firm for any year. 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕  = ∆𝑨𝒔𝒊𝒕 - ∆𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒕 + ∆𝑺𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊𝒕                                         (1) 
Where: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 = firm’s i’s total current accruals in year t 
∆𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in current assets between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊𝒕 =Firm’s i’s change in debt included in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t 
Step 2: Estimate the parameters𝜶𝟏,𝜶𝟐𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜶𝟑. The evaluated parameters of specific industry are used for 
computing the non discretionary accruals. 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕
𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏
=  𝜶𝟏 𝟏𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐 ∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟑 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                 (2)                                                                                  
Where: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =Firm’s i total accruals in year t  
∆𝐑𝐄𝐕𝐢𝐭 = Firm’s i’s change revenues between year t-1 and year t 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 = error term in year t for firm i (unexplained component of total accruals). 
Step 3: evaluating of non-discretionary accruals in year t for each firm. 
𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕  =  ἂ𝟏 �𝟏 𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏� � + ἂ𝟐 �(∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕− ∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕)𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 � +  ἂ𝟑 �𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏�                         (3) 
Where: 
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 𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = total assets at year t-1for firm i  
∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕= revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 for firm i 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i 
𝜶𝟏,𝜶𝟐𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜶𝟑= industry specific parameters that estimated from equation (4) 
Step 4: Determining the amount of discretionary accruals. 
𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕                                                                    (4) 
Where: 
𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕:  Discretionary accruals for firm i in year t (estimated in equation 2) 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕: Total accruals for firm i in year t (estimated in equation 1) 
 𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = total assets for firm i at t-1 
Second Measurement for Earnings Management 
In this study [32] was considered as a latest modified model in estimation of discretionary accruals (as a proxy 
for measuring earnings management), while there are some researches that applied Modified Jones (1995) 
model, in this way, this research also estimates earnings management (discretionary accrual) based on Modified 
Jones model for having comparable result in first objective between two methods (Francis model and Modified 
Jones model). 
Measuring Earnings Management by Modified Jones (1995) Model 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 = ∆𝑨𝒔𝒊𝒕 − ∆𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒕 +  ∆𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊𝒕 − ∆𝑫𝑷𝑵𝒊𝒕/𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏       (5) 
Where: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 = firm’s i’s total current accruals in year t 
∆𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in current assets between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t 
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∆𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝒊𝒕 =Firm’s i’s change in debt included in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑫𝑷𝑵𝒊𝒕 = Depreciation & amortization expense for firm i between year t-1 and year t. 
𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = total assets (net) in year t-1 
Step 2: compute the parameters:  𝛼1,,𝛼2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼3 . Industry specific parameters’ estimation will be used to 
measure the non-discretionary accruals. 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟏 𝟏𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐 ∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕−∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟑 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜺𝒊𝒕                            (6)                                                                     
Where: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =Firm’s i total accruals in year t  
𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = net total assets in year t-1 
∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s change revenues between year t-1 and year t 
∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 = Firm’s i’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 = error term in year t for firm i (unexplained component of total accruals). 
𝜶𝟏,,𝜶𝟐 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝜶𝟑 = specific parameters of industry  
Step 3: estimating the non-discretionary accruals in year t for each firm 
𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕  =  ἂ𝟏 �𝟏 𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏� � + ἂ𝟐 �(∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕− ∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕)𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 � +  ἂ𝟑 �𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏�                (7) 
Where: 
𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕= non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t 
 𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = total assets for firm i at t-1 
∆𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕= revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
∆𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 for firm i 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i 
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𝜶𝟏,𝜶𝟐𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜶𝟑= industry specific parameters that estimated from equation  
Step 4: Determining the amount of discretionary accruals. 
𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 − 𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕                                         (8) 
Where: 
𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕=Discretionary accruals for firm I in year t 
𝑵𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕:  Discretionary accruals for firm i in year t 
𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕: Total accruals for firm i in year t 
In the second part of this study, the effect of accounting standards on earnings management is investigated. The 
relationship between discretionary accruals (proxy on earnings management) and accounting standards is 
examined. 
𝑬𝑴 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝑫𝒔𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑪𝑹𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐(𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 ) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒕) + 𝜷𝟒 (𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺𝒕) + 𝜷𝟓 (𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻𝒕) + ∈𝒕               
(9) 
𝑫𝒔𝒕= dummy variable for accounting standards reform that is 1 for the year of enforcement of accounting 
standards reform and 0 for the other years. 
SIZE= is calculated by the natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
GROWTH = is calculated the growth in sales in year t.  
LOSS = is a dummy variable that is one when there is negative net income, and otherwise zero. 
CR = is the current ratio for controlling the liquidity.∈𝑡is the error term in year t. 
DEBIT= is calculated by the ratio of long term and short term debts to total assets in year t. 
2.1Descriptive analysis 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics:  Bahrain sample 
 
Name of variables N mean Std. Dev. median 
EM (Earnings Management)        251 0.342 0.505 0.223                        
CR (Current Ratio                        251 3.115                     1.963 2.604                        
Growth 251 0.118                    0.178 0.084                        
Debit                                            251 0.100                    0.135 0.039                       
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Size   251 2.367                    0.584 2.252                       
Leverage 251 0.108                     0.146 0.044                       
Loss                                             251 0.191                        0.139 0 
Dst 251 0.517                        0.500 1 
 
Table2: Descriptive Statistics:  Iran sample 
 
Name of variables N mean Std. Dev. median 
EM (Earnings Management)        4086 0.649                       0.081     0.621                            
CR (Current Ratio                        4086 1.241 1.300 1.087                            
Growth 4086 0.258                       1.196 0.136                            
Debit                                            4086 0.818                        0.625 0.721                            
Size   4086 5.860                       3.371 4.600 
Leverage 4086 1.859                       1.912 1.205                            
Loss                                             4086 0.196                        0.397 0 
Dst 4086 0.066                         0.249 0 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics:  UAE sample 
 
Name of variables N mean Std. Dev. median 
EM (Earnings Management)        566 0.617               0.113 0.544                      
CR (Current Ratio                        566 1.658                 1.643 1.312                         
Growth 566 0.504                       0.680   0.680                       
Debit                                            566 2.325                        1.496 2.152                       
Size   566 2.661                     0.676 2.647                    
Leverage 566 0.593                      0.652 0.652 
Loss                                             566 0.035                        0.184 0 
Dst 566 0.769                      0.266 0 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics:  Saudi Arabia sample 
 
Name of variables N mean Std. Dev. median 
EM (Earnings Management)        1091 0.359 0.510 0.401 
CR (Current Ratio                        1091 1.578 1.383 1.246 
Growth 1091 0.732 1.515 0.126 
Debit                                            1091 0.357 0.491 0.202 
Size   1091 2.871                     0.661 2.771 
Leverage 1091 0.358 0.472 0.139 
Loss                                             1091 0.074 0.262 0 
Dst 1091 0.153 0.361 0 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for sample of Bahrain 
 
 EM CR Debt Leverage Growth Loss 
CR -0.121      
Debt 0.072 -0.258     
Leverage -0.243 -0.136 0.042    
Growth 0.058 0.045 -0.162 -0.069   
Loss 0.050 -0.089 0.105    0.109 -0.168  
Size 0.118 - 0.270 0.344 0.324 -0.046 0.184 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix for sample of Saudi Arabia 
 
 EM CR Debt Leverage Growth Loss 
CR -0.052                     
Debt 0.032        -0.064                      
Leverage 0.022 -0.313 0.077    
Growth -0.029       0.022 -0.016 -0.078   
Loss 0.060       -0.010 0.021 0.406 -0.099  
Size 0.072        -0.014        0.026      -0.087 0.096             -0.051 
 
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix for sample of Iran 
 
 EM CR Debt Leverage Growth Loss 
CR -0.013      
Debt 0.018 -0.284     
Leverage  -0.019 -0.104 0.217    
Growth -0.009 0.013 -0.064 -0.049   
Loss 0.012 -0.157 0.501 0.209 -0.131  
Size 0.030 -0.093 0.318 0.085 0.072 -0.325 
 
Table 8: Correlation matrix for sample of UAE 
 
 EM CR Debt Leverage Growth Loss 
CR -0.036      
Debt 0.045 -0.013     
Leverage 0.019 -0.035 0.098    
Growth -0.057 -0.076 -0.185 -0.013   
Loss 0.050 -0.048 0.054 0.031 -0.022  
Size 0.030 0.009 0.042 -0.197 0.086 -0.018 
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Table 9: The Mean of Earnings Management (EM) before and after Accounting Standards Reform 
 
Country Before Accounting Standards Reform After Accounting Standards Reform 
Mean of EM Mean of EM 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Francis Model Modified Jones 
Model 
Francis Model 
Bahrain 0.730 0.577 0.535 0.413 
UAE 0.911 0.777 0.708 0.605 
Iran 0.877 0.725 0.742 0.598 
Saudi Arabia 0.487 0.391 0.452 0.351 
 
 (H1) Enforcement of accounting standards reform has decreased earnings management in Iran. 
 
Table 10:  The results of fixed effect OLS model for sample of Iran Dependent variable: EM (Earnings 
Management) 
 
Variables coefficient Std. Error t-statistic P-value 
CR -0.013 0.018 -0.704 0.481 
Debt 0.082 0.095 0.865 0.387 
Dst (Dummy for accounting 
standards) 
-1.419 0.192 -7.386 0.001*** 
Growth -0.005 0.030 -0.175 -0.861 
Loss 0.098 0.141 0.692 0.488 
Size 0.146 0.063 2.298 0.022** 
Const -0.800 0.885 -0.904 0.366 
R squared             0.49 
Durbin Watson1.66 J- statistic6.93 
 
(H2) Enforcement of accounting standards reform has decreased earnings management in Bahrain. 
 
Table 11: Dynamic panel data estimates the effect of Accounting Standards Reform on Earnings Management 
for sample of Bahrain 
Dependent variable: EM (Earnings Management) 
 
Variables          coefficient Std. Error           t-statistic                 P-value    
CR -0.009 0.024 -0.380 0.703 
Debt 0.061 0.324 0.188 0.851 
Dst (Dummy for accounting 
standards) 
-0.195 0.064 -3.021 0.003***                                      
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Growth -0.476 0.203 -2.343 0.020*** 
Loss 0.005 0.231 0.020 0.973 
Size -0.025 0.077 -0.323 0.746 
Const 0.469 0.225 2.082 0.038 
R squared             0.258 
J_ statistic             1.06 Durbin Watson2.071 
 
(H3) Enforcement of accounting standards reform has decreased earnings management in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
Table12: Dynamic panel data estimates the effect of Accounting Standards Reform on Earnings Management 
for sample of Saudi Arabia 
Dependent variable: EM (Earnings Management) 
 
Variables coefficient Std. Error t-statistic P-value 
CR -0.016 0.008 -2.026 0.043** 
Debt 0.031 0.019 1.628 0.104* 
Dst (Dummy for 
accounting standards) 
-0.053 0.017 -3.078 0.002*** 
Growth -0.019 0.014 -1.323 0.186 
Loss 0.050 0.050 0.988 0.323 
Size -0.040 0.033 -1.180 0.238 
Const 0.208 0.109 1.914 0.055 
R squared      0.116 
J_ statistic            1.21 Durbin Watson2.023 
 
(H4) Enforcement of accounting standards reform has decreased earnings management in UAE. 
 
 
Table 13: Dynamic panel data estimates the effect of Accounting Standards Reform on Earnings Management 
for sample of UAE 
Variables          coefficient Std. Error           t-statistic                 P-value    
CR -0.002 0.013 -0.173 0.862 
Debt 0.008 0.017 0.473 0.636 
Dst (Dummy for accounting 
standards) 
-0.104 0.066 -1.577 0.015**                                   
Growth -0.062 0.032                           -1.975 0.048** 
Loss 0.078 0.106 0.736 0.462 
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Dependent variable: EM (Earnings Management) 
Findings of regressions are presented separately in this chapter. Summary of the results revealed accounting 
reform decreased earnings management in Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Therefore, overall, the 
findings showed 1) the level of earnings management in selected countries in Middle East. 2) Accounting 
standards reforms had significant effect on earnings management in selected stock markets. 
3. Conclusion 
This study includes three objectives. The first objective of the study is, to examine earnings management in 
selected countries. These four countries were selected from Middle Eastern countries because of availability of 
data, importance of these countries in this area in aspects of economy and politically and reform in accounting 
bodies during recent years. The second objective is to examine the relationship between accounting standards 
reform and earnings management. The last objective is, to examine the relationship between leverage and 
earnings management in selected countries. This study uses two approaches for evaluating earnings 
management for achieving to first objective. First, the Francis et al., [32] and second, Modified Jones Model 
[34] were applied to measure earnings management. The regression variations approach was needed to measure 
the impact of accounting standard reform on earnings management and secondly to measure the relation 
between leverage and earnings management in selected countries (for regression models earnings management 
by Francis model was considered). 
Because of the variety of accounting standards and other differences across selected countries, this study 
considers each country separately to test of sub hypotheses. After that, the main hypotheses are tested with using 
analyses of the results of selected countries.  
According to the findings of this study, there is a negative significant relationship between accounting standards 
reform and earnings management in Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE.  Therefore second main hypothesis 
and all sub hypotheses are supported. It means accounting standards reform reduced earnings management in 
UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The results of this study are consistent with [35] & [36] that studied the 
relation between accounting standards and earnings management in the other countries. 
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